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The need for market-oriented reforms was central to the ‘Washington consensus’ which 
emerged in the wake of d isappointing development performance in Latin America and 
success of the export-oriented East Asian countries from the 1980s.  This applied equally 
to labour markets as to international trade, and national product and capital markets, 
although labour markets were not central a central focus of the reform advocates.  
 
More recently, however, labour market standards and regulation have been given more 
attention in the international and domestic policy discussions.  Critics of market-oriented 
reforms have pointed to the backwash effects of globalisation, in particular the impact 
penetration of exports from low wage countries on employment and wages in developed 
countries.  Attention has been drawn to the gap between regulated standards in First and 
Third World  countries.  Further, the deficiencies in social protection and safety nets for 
workers under conditions of economic instability in poor countries have been highlighted 
in the analysis of the impact of the East Asian economic crisis. 
 
This paper surveys the main issues raised in these debates.  We ask whether a new 
consensus is now emerging which gives much higher priority to the regulation of labour 
markets as a means of protecting workers both from exogenous shocks and the social 
costs of rapid economic growth.  Alternatively, is the new ‘neo-institutionalist’ approach, 
that seeks to protect workers directly, often through application of international 
standards, misplaced?  Is there evidence of a need for a paradigm shift, or merely a shift 
in emphasis, or  does the data vindicate the Washington consensus in relation to labour 
markets after all?  
 
The paper is divided into two major sections.  The first deals with the globalisation and 
labour standards debate with special reference to developing East Asia and the second 
with the labour market impact and policy response to the East Asian crisis.
1  In the 
treatment of the globalisation debate, we also draw attention to both early and more 
recent discussions of labour market policies in LDCs.  The second section  examines 
labour market adjustment in selected countries during the crisis and both active and 
                                                                 
*  This is a revised version of a discussion paper presented at a Workshop on Trade and Labour Markets at 
the East-West Center, Honolulu, January 15-16 2001 
1  This survey does not attempt to cover the huge labour market transition issues in China and other former 
command economies in the region.  The focus is on developing East Asia (including the now high income 
economies of Singapore and Hong Kong, as well as South Korea and Taiwan).   2
passive labour market programs as part of a broader ‘social safety net’ approach aimed at 
minimizing the social costs of the crisis. 
 
 
II.  LABOUR STANDARDS, GLOBALISATION AND WORKER WELFARE: 
NEOCLASSICISTS VERSUS NEO-INSTITUTIONALISTS  
 
As in other areas of policy, there have been major swings in ‘mainstream’ economic 
positions on labour market regulation and reform in developing countries over the past 30 
years.  Based on the experience of the 1960s and 1970s, the emphasis in policy reform 
was on deregulation of labour markets in the broader context of programs of structural 
adjustment and trade liberalisation.  By the 1990s, however, international and national 
policy makers talked much more of labour ‘standards’ and ‘social safety nets’, as many 
began to question the benefits of globalisation.  The seeming helplessness of workers 
faced with shrinking job opportunities in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis added 
to the new scepticism of market solutions. 
 
Not surprisingly, many of the advocates of a more interventionist approach have paid 
scant attention to the earlier debates on the role of labour markets in economic 
performance, employment and welfare. I w ill first briefly review some of these 
arguments, given that many of them are as relevant now as they were 10-20 years ago. 
 
Arguments in Favour of Deregulated Labour Markets 
 
Although there was relatively little evidence from micro studies, support for competitive 
and deregulated labour markets emerged with the growing ‘Washington’ consensus 
regarding the gains from export orientation and pro-market reforms from the early 1980s.  
For example, several prominent authors pointed to the potential gains from less 
intervention by governments in labour markets, especially in the context of on-going 
trade reforms in the early years of the decade.
2  They drew attention to the increasingly 
apparent success of the new industrialising economies (NIEs) of Asia, in particular.  High 
levels of labour mobility, flexible wages and employment were viewed as major factors 
supporting rapid economic growth in the NIEs.  
 
In contrast, ‘neo-institutionalists’ advocated an international agenda of promoting 
government and trade union intervention in labour markets through setting and raising 
standards, as a prerequisite to improving labour welfare (Piore, 1984; 1990; Golub, 
1997).  They questioned the negative impact of minimum labour standards on 
employment, pointed to gains in productivity from higher wages and better working 
conditions, and argued that an increased wage share in national income would stimulate 
aggregate demand.  The International Labour Organisation (ILO) was at the forefront in 
promoting this approach.  It is important to recognise, however, that the ILO relied on 
voluntary compliance to basic standards through ratification of basic conventions and 
                                                                 
2  Squire (1981) Krueger (1981) and Fields (1985).  It should be noted, however, that Squire in particular 
(1981: 128) pointed out that the removal of minimum wage distortions, alone, in the modern sector may 
have relatively little impact on employment and incomes in traditional sectors.   3
their supervision through tripartite channels (Leary, 1996).  The organisation did not 
advocate trade sanctions for violations of standards although, implicitly, labour market 
institutions in developed countries, especially in Europe, were viewed as models for less 
developed countries. 
 
What were the main areas of contention?  Much of the criticism of labour market 
regulation dealt with the impact of minimum wages on employment, especially through 
Harris-Todaro processes leading to high urban unemployment in response to minimum 
wages and expected incomes (Todaro, 1976; Fields and Wan, 1989).  Minimum wages 
were also questioned in relation to structural effects of higher than equilibrium wages on 
technology and labour demand (Sen, 1975; Krueger, 1981).  However, there were two 
other main areas of concern.  The first related to the impact of payroll taxes on 
employment and the second to job security regulations. 
 
•  Basic microeconomic theory tells us that payroll taxes raise the cost of labour and 
reduce employment, except under conditions of monopsony or when labour demand 
is inelastic.  Following the European experience, these taxes became widespread in 
developing countries, and particularly in Latin America, especially given limited 
capacity for revenue generation from more conventional sources (Marquez, 1999).   
•  Several areas of job security and severance pay regulation limited employer 
discretion and hence increased labour costs (Fallon and Lucas, 1991).  These included 
controls over the employment of casual workers and employees on short term 
contracts, restrictions to employers’ discretion to dismiss workers and severance p ay 
regulations which made separation costly.
3  
 
Minimum wages and both sets of regulations were considered particularly pernicious in 
developing countries with large, low productivity rural sectors, as in much of Asia.  In 
dualistic labour market models, e mployment growth in the modern sector played a 
critical role in raising labour productivity and welfare.  Since regulation and associated 
higher labour costs were largely limited to the modern sector in such economies, this 
meant a slower shift of workers into higher productivity sectors.
4 
 
The economic disruption and macroeconomic instability associated with populist labour 
regimes in Chile and Argentina convinced many policy makers that strong industry and 
national union movements could do major harm to d evelopment efforts through their 
impact on labour regulation and employment growth.  This contrasted with the 
development success of the ‘labour repression’ models which featured limited labour 
market intervention in the NIEs in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
                                                                 
3  Workers on short term contracts were commonly denied benefits provided to regular workers in addition 
to lacking job security.  Complicated and drawn out industrial relations or legal procedures frequently had 
to be followed in the case of dismissal of individual workers (or mass retrenchment) and severance pay was 
generally tied to years of service, thus discouraging labour turnover.  
4  In the open-economy model, these gains were especially compromised if the modern sector also tended 
to be relatively labour-intensive and export-oriented.   4
It is important to recognise that three fundamental judgements regarding the development 
process in East Asia underpinned these views: 
 
•  rapid employment generation in the modern sector was the fundamental mechanism 
for improvement of household welfare and poverty eradication in developing 
countries 
•  most workers in agriculture, small scale industry and the informal sector were 
excluded from labour protection legislation or labour union negotiated agreements 
•  implicitly, it was believed that improvements in the material conditions of the poor in 
less developed countries (LDCs) were of higher priority than affirmation of certain 
individual and collective rights such as trade union freedoms  
 
A basic presumption, therefore, was that labour standards were  endogenous to the 
development process (Maskus, 1999: 13).  As living standards rose and a higher 
proportion of workers found wage jobs in the modern sector, there would be increasing 
demand for greater security of employment and remuneration, and preservation of certain 
basic standards, as social goods.  Higher incomes meant, moreover, both individuals and 
society could pay for such benefits and, importantly, society was well placed to manage 
them in an equitable and efficient manner.
5 
 
Globalisation and the Labour Standards Debate 
 
By the 1990s there was increased interest in labour market regulation as a means of 
protecting workers from the harmful effects of structural change and unforseen 
exogenous shocks.  Paradoxically, this new attention to labour standards was bolstered by 
increasing fears regarding the impact of globalisation on wages, employment and labour 
standards of unskilled workers in  developed  rather than developing countries.  Both 
organised labour and welfare groups in DCs began to blame unfair competition from 
abroad for increased NIE and other developing country import penetration into the USA 
and EU during the 1980s.  In the East Asian context, Korea and Taiwan were an early 
focus of lobbying in the USA and Europe.  Attention then turned to Indonesia with regard 
to GSP (Generalized System of Preference) special trade access and later to China, 
especially after the latter country emerged as a major player in labour-intensive 
manufacturing exports in the 1990s.   
 
Low labour costs were viewed as one critical factor giving developing countries a 
competitive edge.
6  At the same time, increased mobility between DCs and LDCs and the 
IT revolution increased awareness of the gap in living standards and in labour rights 
between groups of countries.  This led to m ore strident calls for action for recognition and 
implementaton of ‘universal’ standards.  Non-government organisations in both 
                                                                 
5  Limited administrative and legal capacity to implement legislation efficiently and equitably (especially 
when faced with public sector corruption) has been one of the main concerns regarding extension of labour 
protection arrangements, such as unemployment benefits and severance pay systems.  Another has been a 
concern that systems involving significant public subsidies are not viable in during periods of frequent 
economic downturn. 
6  The other important factor was environmental conditions (Anderson, 1996).   5
developed and developing countries, and political alliances of NGOs, supported by first 
world unionists, accused LDCs of ‘social dumping’ and began to lobby for a ‘social 
clause’ in international trading agreements through the WTO. 
 
Insertion of a social clause into international trading agreements was initially rejected at 
the Singapore Ministerial meeting of the WTO in December 1996, largely because it was 
opposed by many developing countries as a protectionist ploy in the DCs.
7  Nevertheless, 
the strength of opposition to perceived backwash effects of globalisation  – in which 
unfair LDC labour standards were viewed as one component  – became increasingly 
obvious when the 1999 Seattle WTO meeting ended prematurely under extreme pressure 
from populist lobby groups largely within the USA. 
 
Thus, catchwords such as ‘a race to the bottom’ were coined in an endeavour to promote 
the notion that DC worker standards being eroded by the much worse labour conditions 
in  LDCs.  Increasingly pleas were being made for ‘harmonization of labour standards’ to 
fit in with the framework used in international trade agendas at the WTO and other 
international bodies (Lee, 1997). 
 
What abuses of labour standards were regarded as particularly threatening to first world 
employment and wages and a transgression of fundamental human rights?  As noted 
above, ‘core’ labour standards were of most concern to the  ILO, US and European 
government agencies and NGOs.  Two groups of these received most attention in the 
international media: the (exploitative) employment of child labour, and labour rights: 
freedom of association (the right to organise trade unions), collective bargaining and the 
right to strike.  Employment of child labour became a key issue in international forums in 
the 1990s.  The EU and US government funded action and research major programs 
through the ILO and other agencies, notwithstanding the small proportion of children 
engaged in export sectors and the relatively small contribution of child labour to total 
output.
8  Consumer action and NGO activists that focused on labour standards in 
multinational companies such as Nike and Reebok, especially focused on this issue. 
 
What was the response of international and labour economists to these proposals? Several 
renowned economists rejected many of the arguments employed by opponents of 
globalisation, and especially the imposition of a social clause in WTO trade agreements, 
as illogical, impractical and self serving.
9  It was argued that domestic labour market 
conditions and productivity levels largely determined wages and labour standards in 
countries at very different stages of development.
10  Bhagwati (1995: 754) sums up the 
variety of objections to a single standards approach: 
“Indeed, the reality is that diversity of labour practices and standards is 
widespread in practice and reflects, not necessarily venality and wickedness, but 
                                                                 
7  The Singapore meeting affirmed the role of the ILO as the appropriate body for monitoring international 
labour standards, resulting in much needed moral and financial boost for the flagging organisation. 
8  The US Department of Labor estimated, for example, less than five per cent of working children in LDCs 
were engaged in export sectors. 
9  See especially Bhagwati (1994), Freeman (1995), Srinavasan (1995), Fields (1995) and Anderson (1996). 
10  Writing for a largely developed country audience Freeman (1995) asked provocatively in the title to a 
paper: “Are Your Wages Set in Beijing”?   6
rather diversity of cultural values, economic conditions and analytical beliefs and 
theories concerning the economic (and therefore moral) consequences of specific 
labour standards.” 
 
Thus, it is the gap between unit labour costs (wages relative to productivity valued at 
international prices) not wages which determine the level of international 
competitiveness.  Golub (1997: 12-14), finds for example, that because productivity 
levels are very low especially in labour-intensive industries in LDCs, the gap between 
DC and LDC unit l abour cost was relatively small. In several East Asian cases (Malaysia 
and the Philippines) LDC unit labour costs exceeded those in USA in 1994 largely 
because of low productivity relative to wage costs in these countries.  Social clauses in 
trade were viewed as potentially harmful to those most in need of jobs in competitive 
labour-intensive industries in East Asia where these jobs had been at the heart of welfare 
improvement and poverty decline. 
 
It was also argued that standards tied to trade would lead to endless disputes and would 
be open to manipulation by interest groups in first world countries.  The vested interests 
of companies and workers finding it difficult to compete in DCs were seen to lie behind 
many of apparent humanitarian concerns regarding third world standards. 
 
Nevertheless, although there is no consensus, a number of concessions were made by 
mainstream economists in response to arguments for introduction of labour standards.  
Some agreed that a distinction should be made in national approaches to standards which 
reflected ‘fundamental’ human rights and those that were based on employment 
conditions (economic rights).
11  The former might at least include ‘core’ labour standards 
while among the latter hours of work and the level of wages were especially important.
12   
A consensus did emerge, however, that the WTO was not an appropriate body for 
implementation of standards, although this notion is still fiercely resisted by some 
sections of the NGO community.  The ILO was viewed as the proper international body 
to monitor and advise on standards and their implementation.  In addition, however, there 
has been a growing awareness that voluntary regulation through consumer action and 
‘product labeling’ are more effective forms of action and, as with eco-labeling, have 
proved effective for a number of specific industries.
13 
 
Critics of the ‘export-oriented’ model of development such as Rodrik (1996), on the other 
hand, advocated a more targeted approach on the behalf of governments.  He suggested 
                                                                 
11  There are basic difficulties in defining fundamental human rights: even for child labour.  For example, 
distinctions have been made between governments and individuals on what is an appropriate age to work 
and what might constitute ‘exploitative’ conditions of work (as reflected in the ILO convention on child 
labour).  Similarly, perceptions of what constitutes discrimination varies enormously between societies 
(Srinavasan, 1996 cited in Maskus, 1998). 
12  Surprisingly, health and safety have not been a key issue on the policy agenda of the those urging 
tougher action on LDC labour standards, given that basic regulation in these fields is relatively simple (and 
supported by substantial ILO research and training) and likely to have only a minor impact on wage costs. 
13  One innovative suggestion is the ‘ratchetting labour standards’.  In this case, best practice standards are 
identified in national contexts and are promoted widely by trade unions, NGOs and other bodies to support 
improvements in lagging firms and industries (Sabel, O’Rourke and Fong, 2000)   7
the imposition of “social safeguard tariffs” against practices which could be shown to be 
morally unacceptable to a majority of citizens in importing countries. 
 
Mainstream Reassessment of the Effects of Labour Regulation 
 
At the same time as vigorous debate flourished over labour standards and trade, there was 
also a softening of attitudes within the economics profession regarding the hitherto 
widely accepted standpoint that enforced labour standards were harmful to employment 
and labour welfare in LDCs.  Several factors were important in moderating the opposition 
to labour market regulation in developing countries.   
 
•  One of the fundamental propositions of neoclassical economic analysis, the 
assumption that minimum wages contributed to unemployment, was challenged by 
research on the impact of minimum wages in the USA and Great Britain (Card and 
Krueger, 1995).  While these results could not be expected to be generalised to very 
different labour market conditions in developing countries, they did suggest that t here 
was much more to the subject than mere quantity adjustments based on demand and 
supply elasticities. 
 
•  Second, research suggested no clear link between labour market regulation and 
economic performance at a national level.  Influential labour economist Richard 
Freeman in research for the World Bank, found  “surprisingly” that there appeared to 
be little support for the view that labour market regulation inhibited macroeconomic 
performance (Freeman, 1993:139-40).  Freeman’s findings suggested several 
possibilities, in addition to the standard explanation of low supply and demand 
elasticities. Either the regulations were not binding or, alternatively, levels of 
compliance were too low.   
 
Subsequent research suggested that both the level of minimum wages w ere set too far 
below average wages and compliance levels were also low.  In a review of the 
literature, Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput, 1997) found that minimum wages were set 
so low in some developing countries (especially those experiencing high rates of 
inflation) that they were not binding for most modern sector firms.  Where they were 
binding, usually in smaller establishments, compliance was typically low and 
compliance costs high.
14  In addition, rigid LDC labour markets did not appear to 
contribute t o substantial rises in unemployment during crises: the main adjustment 
was in wages, especially in high inflation environments, as labour market regulations 
turned out to be ‘paper tigers’ when put to the test (Freeman, 1993:140). 
 
Similarly, Maskus (1999:39) reporting on research conducted by Rama (1995?), 
concludes that “much ambiguity exists” in the econometric linkages between 
                                                                 
14  Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput  (1997: 140) report on studies showing that non-compliance was on 
average much higher among small firms than in larger scale enterprises.  For example, in Mexico the 
proportion of small compared with larger firms which paid average wages well below the minimum was 
24% as against 6% and Columbia 71% versus 27%.  In addition, enforcement mechanisms tended to be 
weak and sanctions relatively light.  See also Nayyar (1995) for East Asian experience and Manning (1998: 
Chapter 8) for a discussion of these issues in the Indonesian case.   8
ratification of ILO conventions and indices of labour market rigidity, on the one hand, 
and economic performance on the other.  Further, he cites Rama’s conclusions that 
that “..inefficient government employment and high unionization rates were the most 
likely explanations of poor performance..” especially under conditions of limited 
product market competition.  As with Freeman’s research, the study did not vindicate 
the views of either the labour market ‘neoclassical’ or ‘neo-institutionalists’ who 
supported greater intervention in labour markets.
15 
 
A major World Bank study of labour markets in both highly regulated and less 
regulated labour markets during structural adjustment episodes in Latin America, 
Africa and Asia provided some support for these findings.  The studies suggested that 
real wages were flexible in both more and less regulated markets (Horton, Kanbur 
and Mazumdar,  1994).  Although several regulations (such as wage indexation and 
job security legislation) limited both price and quantity response in some Latin 
American countries, the main difference in labour market response between the two 
groups of countries related more to macroeconomic policies.  In particular, the 
management of the real exchange rate and associated trends in unit labour costs were 
more fundamental to labour market adjustment than the presence or absence of labour 
market regulation in the modern sector.
16 
 
•  Third, it was generally agreed that the elasticity of labour demand was low in 
regulated economic environments and where other markets were constrained.  Labour 
market reform was likely to convey few gains to workers under such conditions.  Like 
liberalisation of capital markets, there is a logic in a definite sequencing of reforms: 
first product market and then labour market reforms. 
 
Thus, the main findings of the research on trade liberalisation and structural 
adjustment episodes in the 1970s and was that product market distortions were the 
main obstacles to employment and wage growth (Krueger, 1981; Hortan, Kanbur and 
Mazumdar, 1994).  Others have argued that workers and employers were prepared to 
collude in dividing rents under monopolistic or l ess than perfectly competitive 
product market conditions: employment was constrained but wages were relatively 
high in protected sectors (Rama and Tabellini, 1998)?  While this applied mainly to 
Latin America and the former socialist countries, it was also significant in countries 
like Indonesia where vested interests played a major role in protected segments of 
manufacturing and services (Manning, 1998). Similarly, reform of non-competitive 
public enterprises where employees are guaranteed job security and often above 
market clearing wages, is important for promoting productivity and more efficient 
labour markets, as well as for a more competitive economy in general. 
 
                                                                 
15  Similarly, Rodrik (1996) found little evidence for a relationship between labour standards and 
international trade or investment flows. 
16  Mazumdar (1993)) showed this most clearly in his study of Malaysian and South Korean labour market 
response to endogenous and exogenous shocks in both countries in the 1980s.  Unemployment rates rose in 
both countries although much less than in several Latin American countries undergoing structural 
adjustment.  Price and wage adjustment as a result of substantial devaluations ensured that output and 
employment recovered quickly in both countries.   9
In sum, although labour market regulation was still regarded with suspicion in policy 
circles, by the late 1990s more economists were less concerned about their impact on 
employment and welfare than had been the case in the past.  Social protection and so 
called ‘safety nets’ were viewed as providing greater protection at least for workers in the 
modern sector.  It was argued that their distortionary effects were limited for a variety of 
reasons: regulations were not binding; inadequate coverage, poor supervision and 
inadequate sanctions; distortions in other markets were still widespread; and 
macroeconomic policy, rather than regulation, was the major constraint to output and 
employment growth during structural adjustment. 
 
III.  THE EAST ASIAN CRISIS AND SOCIAL SAFETY NETS FOR LABOUR 
 
Anticipated social costs of the East Asian financial and economic crisis in 1997 
contributed to a further questioning of too heavy reliance on globalisation and export-
orientated growth for the welfare of workers and their families, and for poverty reduction. 
 
Why was the response to the East Asian crisis important  in the context of the labour 
market regulation debate?  For several decades the region had been held up by the World 
Bank and many international economists as a model to the developing world.  Market-
oriented reform combined with conservative, pro-export m acroeconomic policy were the 
hallmarks of economic success.  Although mainstream economists did not view their role 
as central to development performance, especially in light of the above-mentioned 
research, labour market flexibility was regarded as one key element supporting rapid 
economic growth and structural adjustment (World Bank, 1993: 258-73). 
 
This situation contrasted with several countries in Latin America where a range of labour 
regulations and strong labour unions contributed to slow labour market adjustment 
following economic shocks and subsequent macroeconomic reform.  Even though there 
was often low compliance and minimum wages were not always binding in Latin 
American countries, regulations which limited employment flexibility and discouraged 
employment, coupled with active unions, contrasted with much of East Asia.  Edwards 
and Lustig (1997: 2) in lamenting extensive labour market regulation in Latin America 
pointed out that : “..East Asian economic success largely resulted from a significant 
degree of labor market flexibility that has allowed small and medium-sized firms to adapt 




In East Asia, not only was economic growth rapid but most indicators of labour market 
performance were positive.  Real wages had begun to rise rapidly in most countries in the 
region by the early 1990s, unemployment rates were low and poverty decline had been 
dramatic throughout the region (Atinc and W alton; 1998; Manning, 1999;).  But, as 
critics of the flexible labour market environment had pointed out, there were few 
institutional safeguards in place to soften the impact of the large decline in labour 
demand which occurred in several countries in the region in 1997-98.  Only South Korea 
                                                                 
17  See also Krueger (1981), Mazumdar (1993), World Bank (1993 and 1995), and Fields (1994) for similar 
viewpoints.   10 
had any sort of national unemployment (employment) insurance scheme and this was 
relatively new and hence coverage and funds were limited (Lee, 1998; OECD, 1999; 
World Bank, 2000a).  In other countries severance pay systems and social security 
extended only to the modern sector.  Although vocational training programs and labour 
market information programs were of some importance in all countries severely affected 
by the crisis (Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia), they were not designed to cope 
with large numbers of displaced workers. 
 
Similarly work fare programs had been important in the region, but had either been 
phased out or were now intended to serve purposes other than providing a cushion against 
macroeconomic shocks: seasonal fluctuations in labour demand, development of rural 
and urban infrastructure and poverty alleviation.
18  In short, the challenge was how would 
labour markets mechanisms and institutions which had served the countries well during 
the long period of expansion deal with an unprecedented fall in output, investment and 
associated labour demand. 
 
Early signs were not encouraging.  There were reports of large scale layoffs in 1997 and 
early 1998 and within a year unemployment rates had doubled i n Thailand and Hong 
Kong China and tripled to a record 8 per cent in Korea (Lee, 1998: 40).  In Indonesia it 
was projected by government and international agencies that unemployment might rise 
more than double in the first full year of the crisis (1998), a nd rise even higher in the 
following year (ILO, 1998).   
 
There was a sense of impending disaster that permeated the international community 
during the first years of the East Asian crisis.  International and national agencies in turn 
responded with a wide variety of support programs.  ‘Social Safety Nets’ rarely referred 
to in the context of East Asian development became a new catchword in the lexicon of 
development.  Devising social protection programs, including those that protect labour, 
began to play a  more prominent role in World Bank operations and research of 
international agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.  
Welfare agencies like the ILO and UNICEF received a new lease of life.  The new ADB 
policy agenda was adjusted to i nclude poverty reduction as a major goal of lending 
projects. 
 
Fiscal stringency and a tight monetary policy first advocated by the IMF gave way to a 
recognition of the need for fiscal stimulus.  All countries worst hit by the crisis had 
revised their budgets to allow for a significant deficit in GDP for the first time in a 
decade (Lee, 1998: 53).
19  In both Thailand and Korea social expenditures accounted for 
a significant proportion of the deficit financing.
20  Much of this new spending was 
allocated directly to households through support for spending on health and education.  
                                                                 
18  For example, Indonesia’s padat karya program which had been an important component of rural public 
works spending for the poor in crisis years several decades earlier was discontinued in 1994, partly because 
it was judged no longer appropriate in the rapidly urbanizing economy. 
19  Increased public spending was supported by substantial foreign support, especially from the Japanese 
government under the Miyazawa initiative announced in the second half of 1998. 
20  Planned social spending also rose significantly in Indonesia although implementation was hampered by 
political instability and administrative inertia.   11 
Direct support for labour market programs was greatest in Korea, followed by Thailand 
and Indonesia among the three worst affected economies.
21 
 
In Korea, the list of programs was impressive.  In addition to substantial expansion of the 
Employment Insurance Program (in terms of both duration and extent of coverage), they 
included: vocational training, job placement and information, job protection, and public 
works programs.  Overall programs to assist displaced workers accounted for two per 
cent of GDP, a far higher share had been allocated to such programs than ever before 
(OECD, 1999: 139).  Similar programs on a more limited scale were introduced in 
Thailand: supplementary support for  existing job creation programs, rural industrial 
employment (including extension of the social security coverage from 6 -12 months for 
unemployed workers) and increased spending on infrastructure projects including the 
training of some 100,000 workers. 
 
How did labour markets adjust to the crises and support programs to assist displaced 
workers and the unemployed?  Three conclusions emerge from more recent studies of the 
crisis economies: labour markets were highly flexible, active employment programs had a 
limited impact and passive labour market policies had even less labour market impact, 
especially in poorer countries in the region.
22  I deal with each of these briefly. 
                                                                 
21  Indonesia differed from the other crisis countries in the high rates of inflation fueled by expansionary 
monetary policy and a massive depreciation of the currency fueled by political instability Johnson (1998). 
22  This section focuses on labour market issues on Korea, Thailand and Indonesia.  For further discussion, 
see especially OECD (1999), Kim, Dae-Il (1999), Kim, Dong-Heon (1999), World Bank (2000) and 
Manning (2000b).   12 
Flexible Labour Markets. 
 
Although there were significant differences between countries, labour markets were 
remarkably flexible in adjusting to the crisis.  Several important developments can be 
noted
23: 
•  Unemployment rates increased relatively little (as in case of Thailand and Indonesia) 
or rose and then fell quite quickly (as in Korea) (Table 1). 
•  Although employment fell in most industries in the first year of the crisis, it began to 
expand quite quickly in tradable goods industries, which were now much more 
profitable as a result of exchange rate adjustments (Table 2).  This adjustment was 
much more rapid than experienced in Latin American labour markets during periods 
of structural adjustment in the 1980s and attests to the benefits of much deeper market 
oriented reforms than in the crisis economies.
24  The adjustment should be seen 
against a backdrop of declining tradable goods employment in Korea and Thailand in 
the decade before the crisis, and only a modest expansion in Indonesia. 
•  With regard to specific sectors, manufacturing employment had returned to close to 
pre-crisis levels in all countries by 1999, only 1-2 years after the crisis.  Surprisingly, 
employment in the tradable agricultural sector, which had contracted in all countries 
during the boom years of the early 1990s, actually expanded quite rapidly in the first 
year of the crisis in Indonesia and fell much less than it had in the previous six years 
in Thailand.  Seemingly unlike several Latin American countries, agriculture 
provided a temporary refuge for workers displaced from the modern sector.  So did 
small scale industry which expanded in export-oriented industries such as furniture, 
and in import substitution industries such as food processing ( Sandee, Andadari and 
Sri Sulandri, 2000). 
•  Wage adjustments were substantial (Table 3).  Real wages fell from the onset of the 
crisis in all countries.  However as labour demand picked up in export-oriented 
industries, they stabilised quite quickly (by the first quarter of 1998 in Thailand and 
Korea) although they continued to fall through 1998 as inflation gathered pace during 
the political crisis in Indonesia.  By early 1999, wage recovery had already begun in 
Korea and by the end of 1999, average real wages had already recovered to levels 
above pre-crisis levels.  A recovery was also visible in the other two countries in 
1999, although real wages (after adjusting for inflation) still remained below pre-
crisis levels, especially in Indonesia. 
•  How did these trends in real wages affect unit labour costs?  As might be anticipated 
from substantial depreciations in the exchange rate, they d eclined in all countries over 
the crisis period 1996-99, thus contributing to an increase in international 
competitiveness, in contrast to rising unit labour costs in the pre-crisis period (Table 
4). 
 
                                                                 
23 Much of the discussion in this section in based on an empirical analysis of adjustment processes in 
Korea, Thailand and Indonesia presented in Manning (2000a). 
24  Compare, for example, with case of Mexico (Lustig, 1998: 70) in the period 1983-88, or Argentina and 
Brazil during the 1980s (Hortan, Kanbur and Mazumdar, 1994).   13 
Nevertheless, there were important differences between  countries in the response to the 
crisis.  In the more developed economy of Korea, modern sector retrenchments were 
quickly reflected in high rates of unemployment.  In contrast, in the less advanced 
economies (for example, Thailand and Indonesia), many of  the displaced workers sought 
employment in the informal sector where work sharing arrangements were common.  
Despite the crisis, many producers were able to adapt production and take on workers in 
new activities, shifting away from less profitable non-tradable goods, or from tradables 
that were overly dependent on imports.
25 
 
In sum, labour market flexibility acted as an important source of social protection, partly 
in the absence of other formal sector forms of support in all countries, and especially in 
Thailand and Indonesia.  Nevertheless, it was also clear that many workers suffered loss 
of jobs and income during the crisis, and this raised the more fundamental question 
regarding the adequacy of social safety nets for workers as a more permanent form of 
protection in East Asia.  Before dealing with this issue, however, I turn first to labour 
market programs adopted during the crisis. 
 
Active Labour Market Programs for Employment Generation. 
 
In general, ALMPs can be divided into three groups: those aimed  at improving the 
quality of labour supply, those aimed at raising labour demand and targeted especially to 
the unemployed (including displaced workers) and those aimed at improving the 
matching of employees and jobs. From the outset it is important to note that ALMPs have 
never been large in most East Asian crisis economies.  This can be attributed to the rapid 
expansion of employment, and low rates of unemployment, associated with sustained 
rapid economic growth and effective macroeconomic management and s tabilisation 
programs in times of crisis. 
 
As noted, this lack of interest in ALMPs changed dramatically with the economic crisis.  
Although there are have been few systematic evaluations of programs in the region, 
evidence to date suggests several preliminary conclusions.  First, the effects were quite 
small in the poorer countries in the region. For example, Lee (1998: 55) estimated that 
less than 10% of all unemployed or displaced workers in Thailand and Indonesia could 
expect to benefit from programs offering direct labour market support.  For example, less 
than half a million unemployed and displaced workers were affected directly by direct 
spending on government programs in Indonesia in a year when some 7 -8 million people 
shifted back into agriculture  as a result of the economic crisis.  However, the figure was 
much higher in Korea where expanded government programs were estimated to have 
benefited well over half of the unemployed, although there were major questions 
regarding the sustainability of these programs.
26 
 
                                                                 
25  For example, small scale manufacturing flourished in several industries in Indonesia, including furniture 
and garments in key produced locations on Java (Manning, 2000b).   
26  Relatively expensive vocational training programs were extended to cover an estimated 25 per cent of all 
unemployed in Korea and some 1.3 million unemployed received some form of assistance out of a total of 
approximately 1.5 million unemployed in that year.   14 
Turning to specific types of program,  on the labour supply side increased unemployed 
meant greater pressure for expansion of vocational training.
27  In Korea, for example, 
vocational training programs expanded dramatically as a result of the c risis, and both 
Thailand and Indonesia special short-term programs (approximately three months) were 
set up to help the unemployed.
28  Programs allowed for greater private sector 
participation and developed innovative approaches for the region, such as linking 
activities to the employment insurance program and providing vouchers in Korea.  In 
Indonesia they involved NGOs in management of the scheme and gave some emphasis to 
training for self employment. 
 
Nevertheless, the programs suffered from a number of p roblems.  Perhaps the most 
important were the old problem of matching the skill focus of the training programs with 
job opportunities (especially since many graduates sought work in the depressed modern 
sector).  Training programs were also poorly of coordinated in several countries.
29 
 
On the  labour demand side, public works programs were expanded quite dramatically 
and provided a fiscal stimulus to both urban and rural areas.  However, Betcherman et al. 
note (p. 28) that problems arose with targeting because wages were set too high.
30  Under 
considerable political pressure, government officers rushed in new programs which were 
often poorly designed and implemented, or had indeed been considered of low priority in 
the pre-crisis period.  Wage subsidies, on the other hand, seem to have worked better, 
although they were limited to Malaysia and Korea.  In Malaysia, moral suasion on the 
part of the governmentcombined with wage subsidies is reported to have contributed to 
fewer layoffs.  In Korea one establishment study suggested that around 20 per cent more 
workers remained in jobs as a result of wage subsidies given to firms that kept employees 
on their payroll, although not necessarily in active employment.   
 
In the informal sector, micro credit programs were also expanded.  In Malaysia, a 
program was adopted to help some 12,000 traders and small businesses whereas in 
Indonesia there was a proliferation of programs of support for to cooperatives, many of 
them administered through NGOs.  The focus of the latter programs were tainted, 
however, as largely politically motivated, and although creating spending power in rural 
areas, probably did little to foster enterprise development. 
 
Finally, with respect to improvement of job search activities, linking job seekers w ith 
employers, were also expanded in most of the crisis countries.  Public employment 
                                                                 
27  This section draws heavily on Betcherman, Das, Luinstra and Ogawa (2000) who in turn have 
summarised the findings of papers given on labour market adjustment in the crisis economies (Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia and Korea) at a workshop hosted by the Japanese Labour Institute in Tokyo in October 
1999.  
28  In the Indonesian case, the program (P3T) was limited to ‘educated’ manpower with at least an upper 
secondary education. 
29  Bethcherman et al. (p.26) mention one extreme example of 19 different Indonesian government 
departments involved in 815 different vocational training programs!  Needless to say government officials 
were eager to be involved in new projects owing to the proliferation of ‘crisis related’ activies. 
30  For example, in the case of Indonesia, where minimum wages levels differed substantially across 
regions, early programs in 1998 set wages at the highest level paid in Jakarta (Rp. 7500) even in regions 
such as Central Java where official minimum wages were around 30% lower.   15 
services existed prior to the crisis in all countries, although the large number of 
government centres was still small in relation to the total work force.  Since these 
services were generally not linked to unemployment insurance (except in Korea), the 
incentive for companies to register vacancies and for job seekers to use the public 
employment services has always been limited.  In the case of Korea, the fact that 
unemployed needed to register with the exchanges in order to obtain benefits meant that 
companies could draw on a larger pool of job seekers and hence had more incentive to 
register job vacancies. 
 
Nevertheless, new information technology and private sector involvement has probably 
helped improve the efficiency of employment services, although skill deficiencies in 
operating new systems was a constraint (Betcherman et al., p. 25). 
 
What was the likely overall impact of the new active labour market programs?  As noted, 
their aggregate labour market impact was relatively small.  In addition, many suffered 
from similar problems noted in a recent survey of ALMPs in Europe: design was critical 
to success and modest, carefully targeted programs with clear objectives worked best  
(Dar and Zsannatos, 1999).  On all these counts, the hastily devised programs in East 
Asia scored badly.  This is not necessarily an indictment of the programs per se, as to the 
specific form they took, often because of lack of care in program formulation. 
 
As in the OECD, youth training schemes were probably least cost effective.  But in 
contrast to the experience in the OECD, wage subsidies were more successful in the crisis 
countries where government administration was relatively efficient (and  clean), owing to 
the strong influence of the government in offering both incentives for compliance and 
threatening sanctions on those firms unwilling to participate. 
 
‘Passive’ Labour Market Programs. 
 
In Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, two major schemes for worker social security were 
already in place when the crisis broke: (i) provident funds covering pensions, disability 
and worker health, and (ii) severance payments related to years of service with the firm.
31  
Provident funds require both employer and employee contributions in relatively equal 
amounts, normally to be withdrawn as a lump sum at retirement age of 55 (see Cox-
Edwards and Manning, 2000; 12).
32  As noted, Korea, on the other hand, combined 
similar but much wider social security coverage with an (un)employment insurance 
system funded by the government, employees and employers.  All the crisis countries 
except Malaysia had a regulated system of minimum wages set by the government, which 
varied by region in Indonesia and Thailand. 
 
                                                                 
31  Severance pay was set according to years of service.  However, even though there were some restrictions 
over dismissals in Indonesia, job security has not been a major issue in the region, in contrast to India and 
Latin American countries. 
32  Coverage extended to an approximate 15% of the employed population in Indonesia and Thailand and a 
much higher 48% in the case of Malaysia (Lee, 1998: 52).  While contributions were mandated for all firms 
with 10 or more employees in Thailand and Indonesia, in practice payments coverage was heavily biased in 
favor of larger establishments with 100 employees or more.   16 
Although information is fragmentary, it is possible to draw attention to several effects of 
the crisis.  Except in Korea, formal mechanisms of support such as minimum wages and 
severance pay played a minor role, even among wage workers, in supporting labour 
standards i n the poorer crisis economies.  Official minimum wages played virtually no 
role in stemming the substantial decline in average real wages in any of the crisis 
countries.  The level at which wages were set were not binding employers in the modern 
sector who were worst hit by the crisis (especially in the case of Korea) or enforcement 
mechanisms were weak or officials turned a blind eye to an emerging gap between 
official minimum and actual wages. 
 
In the case severance pay, studies have found that few displaced workers gained any 
severance pay especially in the frequent case of bankruptcy, and most of those that did 
were in larger and often foreign establishments in Indonesia and Thailand, (SMERU, 
2000; World Bank, 2000a).
33  The experience of the crisis suggests that prevailing 
systems in these countries based on years of service and financed by employers may not 
be the best systems, both at times of sharp falls in labour demand or in more normal 
periods. 
 
Severance payments defined as multiple of prevailing s alaries at the moment of 
separation, as in much of East Asia, are not defined contribution programs.
34  Workers in 
the same job have to be compensated differently because of different tenures.  As a result, 
management conflicts arise which adversely affect  the working environment. New 
systems can be designed whereby all workers (through their employers) are required to 
establish a ‘job termination account’ which are accessible at the time of dismissal, or 
even voluntary separation.  Problems arising from different payments according to 
seniority can thus be avoided if severance payments are defined by law in terms of 
explicit contributions towards such a fund.  In effect, severance payments become a 
forced savings program.  The exact amount at the disposal of each individual worker in 
case of employment termination (quits or dismissals) will be directly determined by the 
funds accumulated in his/her account. 
 
Protection mechanisms through the employment insurance scheme only worked sligthly 
better in Korea than severance pay systems in other countries, although they were more 
closely linked to training programs and job search activities than many traditional 
unemployment insurance programs.  Three problems in particular are worth mentioning.  
First, a high proportion of the unemployed could not gain access to several programs, 
including and many wage workers who did not qualify for coverage.
35  Further, coverage 
is expected to expand slowly.  The Korean Labor Institute has projected that a significant 
                                                                 
33  A World Bank (2000a: 41) assessment of the social impact in Thailand found that over 90 per cent of 
employees in establishments with 1-9 workers, and over 70 percent in firms with 10-99 workers, received 
no severance pay during the first year of the crisis, in contrast to slightly over half of all employees in 
larger establishments. 
34  For a fuller exposition see Cox-Edwards and Manning (1999). 
35  The ratio of benefit recipients to the total number of unemployed was only 13 per cent  in June 1999 
(Kim, Dong-Heon, 1999: 34-35).Workers in small and self-employed enterprises, were particularly badly 
affected since they did not qualify for unemployment benefits but at the same time were not poor enough to 
be eligible for livelihood support programs.     17 
share of workers (nearly 10 million) would be eligible to receive unemployment 
insurance only by the year 2002. 
 
A second problem was the escalating cost of the programs.  EIS contributions on the part 
of employers doubled in 1998-99 from one to two per cent of the p ayroll (including 
employment fund contributions, vocational training levies and payments to job security 
and wage claims programs).
36  Third, implementation of many programs depended in part 
on cooperation between employers and employees.  In Korea as in other countries, there 
was a major attempt to set up structures to encourage social dialogue on a tripartite basis 
(involving the government, labour organisations and employers) but the institutional 
basis for such cooperation was weak after long periods of  control of the labour 
movement.  
 
In sum, while labour market programs, both active and passive, appear to have played 
some part as social safety nets during the East Asian economic crisis, it would seem that  
the flexibility of labour markets (and associated commodity markets) played the major 
role in helping economies get back on their feet.  Labour markets adjustment to changes 
in relative prices and incentives were supported by social sector spending in health and 
education in critical in supporting adjustments among the poor (World Bank, 2000b). 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Returning to the questions posed at the beginning of the paper, we conclude that there are 
no grounds for a paradigm shift regarding the role of labour standards and social safety 
nets pertaining t o labour, either as instruments of social policy or as an effective 
mechanism to redress ‘unfair’ competition in the world trading system.  Beyond several 
cases, relatively unimportant in the overall context of the world trade, labour costs have 
not been d epressed by the absence of ‘internationally acceptable’ labour standards.  
Rather they are low because of low productivity associated with underdevelopment.  
Insofar as labour standards have improved, the process has been endogenous to the 
development process in countries like Korea that are in the process of a development 
transition.  Improved standards in the initially small modern sector spread more widely as 
low productivity pockets of the economy disappeared.  At the same time demands for 
greater security, sometimes at the expense of income, coupled with the disappearance of 
traditional coping mechanisms, assumed a greater role in social preferences.  
 
The experience of the Asian economic crisis does not lead to a reassessment of this 
position regarding labour standards in poorer countries.  I have argued that the presence, 
or absence, of passive labour standards such as minimum wages or job security 
legislation (including severance pay regulations) had only a minor bearing on labour 
market outcomes: both from efficiency and welfare perspectives.  Similarly, active labour 
market programs can be important in softening the impact of economic crisis but they 
need to be carefully designed and targeted.  Traditional mechanisms of adjustment 
                                                                 
36  It is projected that contributions by both employers and employees, or government subsidies, would 
have to increase significantly if the benefit schemes were to remain financially viable in the future.   18 
through access to j obs in the informal sector and agriculture, work sharing and multiple 
jobs were the critical factors in enabling workers and their families to adjust to the crisis.  
 
In upper middle income countries such as Korea, unemployment insurance did play an 
important role in cushioning the social effects of the crisis.  But the fundamental lesson 
from labour market experience during the crisis throughout the region was that flexible 
product markets and prices, complemented by accommodating labour markets, were 
critical for recovery in employment and wages.  The East Asian economies had already 
made substantial progress towards greater international openness and flexible prices 
when they faced an international crisis in 1997, in contrast to their Latin American 
counterparts that had experienced similar crises almost two decades earlier.  In Latin 
America, failure to reform was  part of the crises of the 1980s, and labour market 
regulation became increasingly a central part of the problem once trade and other market 
reforms had been initiated (Edwards and Lustig, 1997). 
 
This in no way suggests that it is sufficient to rely entirely on competitive product, capital 
and labour markets for protecting labour welfare.  There has been a necessary correction 
of the earlier rather simplistic characterisation of labour market regulations as 
distortionary under most conditions.  Thus, one can draw several lessons from national 
and international experience with regulated labour standards.  First, to be effective, for 
the most part t hey need to be part of the national political and social agenda and not 
imposed on the basis of externally imposed international standards.  Second, insofar as 
international action with respect to labour standards is relevant, it should focus on several 
core standards related to rights rather than conditions of employment.  Third, 
international action with regard to core labour standards should be channeled through 
expert organisations such as the ILO which focus on voluntary participation backed by 
moral s uasion and technical support, or through consumer and related organisations 
acting in a private capacity. 
 
Devising both active and passive labour standards and safety nets that are consistent with 
employment expansion in the modern sector is one important priority in contexts where 
the transfer of labour from low productivity, traditional sectors is the major challenge for 
poverty alleviation.  LDCs are fortunate in being able to draw on the experience of DCs 




In the discussion of social safety nets, we have drawn attention to two kinds of policies.  
Active labour market programs are for the most part poverty-targeted, emergency, 
programs.  They a re not necessarily focussed on the unemployed, since unemployment is 
not the most important characteristic of the poor even during a crisis, these programs are 
considered effective mechanisms to reach out households severely affected by income 
loss.  In general, flexible approaches and a large degree of local autonomy in the 
disbursement of funds characterise effective poverty targeting and/or emergency 
employment programs. 
                                                                 
37  See Cox-Edwards and Manning (2000) for a discussion of some of these issues in the context of the East 
Asian crisis.   19 
 
The second set of policies, passive labour market programs, includes all permanent-type 
labor market interventions focussed on dismissals and/or the unemployed.  Labor market 
interventions can address the risk of income loss associated to formal employment not 
only in a recession but also during the normal operation of a growing economy.  For 
instance, i n most developing countries, including the countries discussed in the context of 
the East Asian economic crisis, there is legislation in place that regulates severance 
payments in case of dismissal or layoffs.  
 
How can these programs be r eformed as a permanent feature of the social security 
network to deal more adequately with periodic economic downturns?  It can be argued 
that it is important to build on existing laws and institutions than devise completely new 
one.  For example, given the long tradition of severance payments, it makes political 
sense to try to improve upon the existing systems rather than to add an unemployment 
insurance program, at least until countries reach a relatively advanced standard of living 
such as in Korea.  But given the failure of the severance payment systems for many 
workers during the crisis, there are strong arguments for reforming these systems in the 
direction of individual accounts to which employers and employees contribute. 
 
Implicit in the discussion in this paper has been the assumption that systems cannot be 
willy-nilly transferred across national boundaries without taking into account stage of 
development, pre-existing labour market structures and institutions, and the socio-
political environment.   I have also assumed that one must take into account dualism as a 
fundamental feature of labour markets in most LDCs.  While it is accepted that 
implementation of labour policies in the modern sector will be constrained by levels of 
productivity and earnings in traditional sectors, the application of different standards will, 
and should, apply to the modern sector where productivity is often much higher.  As Sen 
(2000: 120) notes, there is no need to “level down” conditions of workers in the modern 
sector t o meet those of less fortunate workers in the informal sector and agriculture.  A 
fundamental rule of thumb should be, however, that these standards are not in conflict 
with productivity or employment growth in the modern sector.   20 
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TABLE 1:   LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, KOREA, THAILAND AND INDONESIA, 
1996-1999 (%) 
 
  1996  1997  1998  1999 
         
Korea         
Labour force participation
1  62.0  62.2  60.7  60.5 
Unemployment rate  2.0  2.6  7.3  6.7 
Thailand         
Labour force participation
1   69.3  69.2  68.1  67.8 
Unemployment rate  1.6  1.6  4.3  4.4 
Indonesia         
Labour force participation
1  66.9  66.3  67.0  67.2 
Unemployment rate  4.9  4.7  5.5  6.4 
         
Note: Korea: average of four quarters; Thailand average for February(slack) and August 
(busy) seasons.  Indonesia annual survey (August). 
 
1  Labour force participation rates 
 
Sources: ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics, various years;  Thailand NSO, National 
Labour Force Survey, August and February Round ; Indonesia: CBS, National Labour 
Force Survey, 1996-1999.  Korea, Korea Labour Institute, Quarterly Labour Review, 
various numbers. 
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TABLE 2:  EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS IN TRADABLE AND NON-TRADABLE 
INDUSTRIES, KOREA , THAILAND AND INDONESIA, 1990-1999 
 
    Growth (% p.a.) 
 




(%)    1990-96  1996-99    1996  1997  1998  1999 
Korea                   
Tradables  45    -2.3  -5.8    100  96  89  90 
Non Tradables  55    5.3  -0.2    100  104  100  102 
Thailand                   
Tradables  74    -1.8  -0.2    100  101  99  99 
Non Tradables  26    6.5  -1.2    100  99  95  96 
Indonesia                   
Tradables  66    -0.5  2.1    100  97  105  106 
Non Tradables  100    6.1  1.8    100  107  104  106 
Notes:  Growth rate for Indonesia 1990-1996 includes East Timor, Ages 10 and above; 
All other data excludes East Timor, ages 15 and above.  Growth rate for Thailand 1990-
1996 for August round of the Labour Force Survey, all other data average of August and 
February rounds.  Korea data annual average.  In each country, tradable goods include 
agriculture, mining and manufacturing and non-tradables all other sectors. 
 
Sources:  See Table 1.   25 
TABLE 3:  GROWTH OF AVERAGE REAL WAGES IN MANUFACTURING 
AND ALL SECTORS,KOREA,THAILAND AND INDONESIA, 1991-1999
1 
 
 Growth (% p.a.) 
 
  Index (1996=100) 
 1991-96  1996-99    1996  1997  1998  1999 
Korea
2               
Manufacturing  6.9  1.2    100  101  91  104 
All Sectors  6.7  4.1    100  107  107  113 
Thailand               
Manufacturing  7.8  1.2    100  108  103  104 
All Sectors  7.0  1.4    100  106  105  104 
Indonesia               
Manufacturing  6.9  -8.3    100  106  66  78 
All Sectors  6.4  -6.1    100  104  69  83 
 
1  All nominal average wages deflated by the CPI in each country. 
2  Data for regular employees, to third quarter 1999.  For 1991-1996 data are taken  
from NSO, Major Statistics of the Korean Economy (monthly).  For 1996-1999 data 
are taken from the Korean Labor Institute, Quarterly Labor Review, 12(4), page 8. 
 
Source: Source:  Indonesia. CBS, National Labour Force Surveys, 1991-1999. 
Thailand, NSO, Labour Force Survey, February and August (average of two rounds), various 
years.  Korea. NSO, Major Statistics of the Korean Economy (monthly) and The Korean 
Labor Institute, Quarterly Labor Review, 12(4), page 8. 
 